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THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS: EXPLORING THE ISSUES OF
VOLUNTARINESS AND ACCURACY
SAMUEL M. DAVIS*
INTRODUCTION
The decade of the sixties witnessed an incredible amount of inquiry
into the pretrial investigatory stages of the criminal process and the trial
itself. But the guilty plea process and its impact have received little
attention until recently. Even when the guilty plea process has been the
subject of judicial scrutiny, attention has been focused only upon the
most visible parts of the process--i.e., representation by counsel and
inquiry by the court into the circumstances surrounding the decision to
plead guilty.' The minimal concern is especially perplexing in light of
the fact that, of the number of criminal cases resulting in conviction, the
plea of guilty remains by far the most frequent basis for conviction.'
Indeed, as many as 85 to 90 percent of criminal prosecutions are con-
cluded on the basis of guilty pleas,8 and in some jurisdictions this
figure runs as high as 95 percent." Whatever the exact--or even
approximate-number of convictions that results from guilty pleas, two
things are clear: the number is significantly high, and the amount of
concern directed toward the plea process is extremely disproportionate to
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Enker]. While reference is made in the text to the "most
visible" portions of the plea process, no part of the process can really be characterized as
"1visible;" some are just less invisible than others. In this sense the guilty plea process
is analogous to the iceberg, the majority of which is under water.
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIIUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 1-2 (1967) (adopted, as amended, by
House of Delegates in 1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS].
3. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, . KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 566 (1969) [hereinafter cited as REMINGTON]. See W. SCHA-
FER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 8 (1967). In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969), the Supreme Court reported that in 1968, 86 percent of all convictions obtained
in the federal district courts were the result of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Id. at
463 n.7.
4. A.B.A. STANDARDS 2.
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the number of such cases. Granted that large numbers of defendants
enter pleas of guilty, it becomes critically important to know why this
occurs.
5
PARAMETERS OF THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
The Significance of the Plea to the Defendant
The United States Supreme Court has underscored the gravity of
the decision to be made by a defendant who seeks to plead guilty. Such a
decision operates as a waiver of precious constitutional rights: 1) the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 2) the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury and 3) the sixth amendment right to con-
front one's accusers.6 Any waivers of these rights must be voluntary; but
more than this, they "must be knowing, intelligent acts done with suf-
ficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. '
This places a heavy burden upon the trial court to learn whether the
defendant is aware of what the plea connotes.' Addressing itself to this
issue, the Supreme Court has attempted to impart the significance of
accepting a guilty plea by describing its effect:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere
admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a con-
viction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not
required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and
sentence.'
5. There are a number of reasons why people plead guilty, some of which are known
and identifiable, others of which are more subtle and consequently less likely to be de-
tected. The following is only a partial list of the more obvious reasons:
For some people, their breach of a State's law is alone sufficient reason for
surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others, apprehension
and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting
their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence
may convince the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth the agony
and expense to the defendant and his family.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
6. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Each of these rights is now
applicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right
to confrontation).
7. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Since a guilty plea operates
as a waiver of each of the rights mentioned, the standard for waiver is concomitant with
the standard for accepting a plea of guilty: "A guilty plea must be not only voluntary,
but also knowing and understanding." Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
8. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
9. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962), quoting Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
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The American Bar Association in its Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice has further elaborated on the substance of a plea of
guilty:
While a confession only relates a set of facts, and thus
only requires knowledge of the factual situation, a plea is an
admission of all the elements of the charge, and thus requires
a sophisticated knowledge of the law in relation to the facts."
Insofar as knowledge of the facts is concerned, the defendant is
similarly situated whether he is making a confession or tendering a plea
of guilty-in either event he typically has the greatest knowledge of the
factual situation. But to place these facts into proper perspective with the
law, he needs the advice of counsel. Indeed, if his plea is accepted and he
has not had the benefit of advice of counsel, his plea is not "intelligent"
or "understanding" and is void."
Several recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court indicate
that the Court is now very reluctant to grant relief to a defendant who
offered his plea of guilty after conferring with counsel and receiving the
adequate advice of counsel. 2 For example, in Brady v. United States 8
the Court said:
[A]bsent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct
by state agents . . . a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently
made in the light of the then applicable law does not become
vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea
rested on a faulty premise."
Similarly, the Court in McMann v. Richardson"8 said:
In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reason-
ably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack
10. A.B.A. STANDARDS 26. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969),
the Supreme Court said that a guilty plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id. at 466.
11. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956). See also
Louisiana ex rel. Gwin v. Dees, 410 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied Gwin v. Hen-
derson, 396 U.S. 918 (1969) ; Smith v. United States, 400 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1968).
12. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); and Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
13. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
14. Id. at 757 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court concluded that a guilty
plea was not void solely because it was tendered to mitigate the possibility of imposition
of the death penalty, even though the decision seems to conflict with United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
15. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admis-
sibility of the defendant's confession.1"
The defendant's estimation of this situation is based largely, if not
entirely, on his attorney's advice. Whether this advice stems from an
erroneous, though reasonable, interpretation of then existing law, or
whether it is correctly based on then existing law that is later invalidated
by judicial decision, the result is the same-the defendant is bound by
his plea." Moreover, if there is a factual basis for the plea, he is bound
even if he claims that he is innocent of the conduct charged but for
some reason wishes to plead guilty."
The Scope of the Process Itself
Assuming for the moment that with advice of counsel a defendant
understands the consequences of his plea, what motivations, if any,
prompt him to offer a plea of guilty ?"9 To understand the motivations
one must remember that an identifiable guilty plea process exists and
remains as the mainstay of the system of criminal justice."0
16. Id. at 770. The defendant was challenging the validity of his guilty plea on the
basis that it stemmed from an illegally obtained confession. In explaining the result
reached, the Court said:
A more credible explanation for a plea of guilty by a defendant who would
go on trial except for his prior confession is his prediction that the law will per-
mit his admissions to be used against him by the trier of fact. At least the prob-
ability of the State's being permitted to use the confession as evidence is suf-
ficient to convince him that the State's case is too strong to contest and that a
plea of guilty is the most advantageous course.
Id. at 769.
17. E.g., the Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) said:
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when moti-
vated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as an
initial matter, not on whether a court would retroactively consider counsel's
advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Id. at 770-71. Expanding on this, the Court continued:
It is no denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant waives
his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then ex-
isting; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his at-
torney's assessment of the law and facts. Although he might have pleaded
differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound by his plea
and his conviction . ...
Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
18. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The trial court had heard
a very convincing case presented against Alford and accepted his plea as an indication
of his preference to have the case settled in this manner without trial.
19. Some of the more obvious reasons have been given previously. See notes 5 and
16 supra.
20. REMINGTON, supra note 3, at 566. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged this fact in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968).
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The plea process formally begins with the arraignment, at which
time the defendant is charged with a particular offense and wherein he
must make a response to the charge.2' The process really begins, however,
before the accused makes a formal appearance in court. Informal dis-
cussions ("plea bargaining," "plea negotiations") usually take place
between the defense counsel and the prosecutor in an effort to reach an
agreement whereby the accused may enter a plea of guilty in exchange
for certain concessions."
Plea agreements take many forms. The most common form occurs
when the prosecutor agrees to reduce the charge to an offense less
serious than that initially charged in exchange for the defendant's agree-
ment to plead guilty to the lesser offense.23 Realistically, the defendant is
seeking to reduce the maximum sentence to which he will be exposed.
To this extent, the same result is achieved when the prosecutor drops
some of the counts in a multi-count indictment or agrees not to charge
the defendant as an habitual offender.2 The prosecutor's bargaining
power and the range of penal provisions from which he may choose are
very great in the granting of charge concessions.25
Another form of plea agreement is an agreement by the defendant
to plead guilty to the offense charged in exchange for the prosecutor's
promise to recommend leniency in sentencing or specifically to recommend
21. REMINGTON 565.
22. A.B.A. STANDARDS 3.
23. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]. A charge reduction was the substance of the plea agreement made in North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
24. TASK FORCE REPORT 10-11. The Supreme Court's analysis of the decision-
making process through which a defendant arrives at his decision to plead guilty is
incongruous. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Supreme Court
said that a statutory scheme that made a defendant choose between exercise of the right
to trial by jury on the one hand and the risk of the death penalty on the other placed
a constitutionally impermissible burden on the defendant. The statutory scheme was
such that if a defendant pleaded guilty, the maximum sentence the judge could give him
was life imprisonment. However, if he insisted on a jury trial by pleading not guilty
and was thereafter convicted, upon the jury's recommendation he could receive the death
penalty. But in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), the Court, faced with
a similar statutory scheme, said the defendant's otherwise valid guilty plea merely
stemmed from his desire to limit the maximum sentence to which he could be exposed.
The same result and reasoning are also found in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970).
Justice Brennan was very upset over the Court's action in Parker, arguing that its
holding undermined the prior determinations of Jackson concerning the voluntariness of
guilty pleas. He felt that under Parker a plea of guilty would never be vitiated except in
very unrealistic situations. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 800 & n.2 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion). See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
25. TASK FORCE REPORT 11.
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a light sentence or probation. Unlike charge concessions, however, the
prosecutor's power here is limited. He can only make recommendations
to the judge; the judge alone determines what the sentence actually will
be.
Judges treat recommendations differently, some giving them varying
degree of weight and others feeling obligated to accept them, believing
that acceptance of recommendations is an essential part of the plea
process.2" Some courts have regarded as improper the practice of granting
greater leniency in sentencing to defendants who have pleaded guilty
than to those who have been convicted at trial. Such a practice, the
judges feel, places an impermissibly heavy burden on defendants to waive
their right to trial by jury and to plead guilty instead." In Scott v. United
States,8 the court gave the following account: "The trial judge . .
stated at the sentencing hearing, 'If you had pleaded guilty to this offense,
I might have been more lenient with you.' The stark import of this
comment is that the defendant paid a price for demanding a trial."29 On
the other hand, an argument can be made for more lenient treatment for
defendants who plead guilty, for such a move by an offender may be the
first step in the rehabilitative process and is indicative of the defendant's
desire to purge his guilt and to seek the earliest application of the process
of rehabilitation."
Whatever a particular judge's practices may be, however, they are
likely to be known to the prosecutor and defense counsel and perhaps to
the defendant himself.2 ' Even in the absence of a specific "bargain"
between the prosecutor and the defendant or his counsel, a defendant may
enter a plea of guilty because of his reliance on prevailing practices and
26. Id.
27. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 869 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Guilty Plea Bargaining].
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
28. 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 269.
30. Guilty Plea Bargaining 869. But the idea that a plea of guilty represents the
penitence of the accused and is therefore the first step in the rehabilitory process has
been negated as well. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 271 & n.33 (D.C. Cir.
1969). The problem is that acceptance of the notion that a guilty plea connotes contri-
tion leads to an unacceptable corollary, i.e., that insistence upon a jury trial suggests a
lack of contrition. After all, "[t]he adversary process is a fact-finding engine, not a
drama of contrition in which a prejudged defendant is expected to knit up his lacerated
bonds to society." Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1969). One
writer has suggested that the guilty plea process resembles "the purchase of a rug in a
Lebanese bazaar" more than it does "the confrontation between a man and his soul."
Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 THE ANNALS 70, 75 (1967).
31. TASK FoRcE REPORT 11.
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the justified assumption that he will be treated with greater leniency
because he has pleaded guilty. 2
The kind or degree of concessions, or whether any will be granted
at all, depends to a large extent on how the prosecutor views his role.
He may view his role as being that of a legislator mollifying the harsh-
ness of the law not only for this defendant but for all defendants.8 "
Many prosecutors, however, vigorously disavow the propriety of allowing
personal opinion to enter into their plea bargaining judgment. They view
their role as administrators as far more basic and realistic, motivated by
a desire to handle heavy case loads in the most efficient, expedient and
effective manner consistent with the ends of justice. However the pro-
secutor may view his role, in reality, a "routine" plea agreement is
practically nonexistent.8 '
Without a doubt, plea bargaining is a pervasive process"5 that has
become a very real and necessary part of the administration of criminal
justice 6 to such a degree that the effective administration of the system
depends on a continuous flow of guilty pleas." Viewed in the abstract, a
system whereby most defendants plead guilty possesses certain virtues.
32. Id. at 9. The court in Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
underscores the prevalence of the practice: "[E]mpirical evidence supports the proposi-
tion that judges do sentence defendants who have demanded a trial more severely." Id. at
269. The court continued:
Indeed, if the custom is sufficiently well known, actual bargaining may be un-
necessary: enough defendants will be cowed into guilty pleas simply by the
force of their lawyers' warnings that defendants convicted after demanding a
trial receive long sentences.
Id. at 272.
33. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. Rtav. 50,
53 (1968). "Plea negotiations concerning charges provide an opportunity to mitigate the
harshness of a criminal code or to rationalize its inconsistencies and to lead to a disposi-
tion based on an assessment of the individual factors of each crime." TASK FORCE RE-
PORT 11.
34. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
52-54 (1968). "[T]he prosecutor must determine on a case-by-case basis the concessions
that he will offer to guilty-plea defendants. . . . In practice, the benefits of a guilty
plea are personalized for each defendant." Id. at 53.
The reluctance of prosecutors to permit personal opinion to enter into the decision-
making process may stem from the disdain shared and encouraged by most of the legal
profession for any form of emotional involvement. The lawyer's self-image--created and
cultivated in the legal educational process-is one of the rational, coldly scientific being.
See J. POLLER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 2 (1968) ; Watson,
The Quest for Professional Cornpetence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37
U. IN. L. REV. 91, 131 (1968). Without considering whether this is an appropriate
criticism, it does explain the prosecutor's preference to view himself as an administrator,
detached from any personal evaluations.
35. See Guilty Plea Bargaining 870 & n.21.
36. TASK FORCE REPORT 10.
37. REMINGTON, supra note 3, at 567. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968).
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In the first instance, the value of expediency is clear. The argument is
made that courts could not bear the immense burden of trying all of the
cases on their dockets. The dockets are crowded under the present system,
and even a sizeable increase in the number of cases tried would mean a
redistribution of time, talent and money which, with these valuable com-
modities spread so thin, would inevitably mean a diminution in the
quality of justice.88 Standing alone, however, the virtues of efficiency
and speed hardly suffice as an adequate justification for the continued
dependence on a large number of defendants pleading guilty.
Much more is involved than mere economy. On the one hand the
guilty plea process seeks to achieve certain correctional goals in the
interest of fitting an appropriate punishment to the particular circum-
stances of the act or the individual.2 Thus, when an offender pleads
guilty, he assures that correctional measures will be applied right away.
His plea also avoids any delay in disposition of other cases and therefore
increases the probability that corrective measures will be applied as
soon as possible to other offenders. In addition, by pleading guilty
an offender presumably acknowledges his guilt, indicating that he is
prepared to accept responsibility for his behavior."
At the same time, the guilty plea process seeks to relieve both the
prosecutor and the defendant from some of the hazards and failings of
the trial process.4' Moreover,
it preserves the meaningfulness of the trial process for those
cases in which there is a real basis for dispute; it furnishes
defendants a vehicle to mitigate the system's harshness, whether
that harshness stems from callous infliction of excessive punish-
ment or from the occasional inequities inherent in a system of
law based upon general rules; and it affords the defense some
participation in and control over an unreviewable process that
often gives the appearance of fiat and arbitrariness.42
It is important, in this sense, to preserve the value, usefulness and
integrity of the trial process. If the right to trial is asserted in every
case where there is no substantial issue of guilt, our attention will be
38. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
39. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52
(1968).
40. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 2. But see note 30 supra (questioning
whether a defendant's tender of a guilty plea represents penitence on his part).
41. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
42. Enker, supra note 1, at 117.
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misdirected. Our concern will be directed away from the more appropriate
subject of correctional treatment and rehabiliation toward the matter of
guilt itself which, since guilt is not seriously in question, might incline
courts-and juries as well-to become more skeptical of the defense.4
This alone may be justification for the continuation of the guilty plea
process.
Clouding the validity of a system that encourages a large number of
guilty pleas, however, is a growing concern over whether plea bargaining
is a proper, legitimate practice in the first place, and, if it is, under what
circumstances it is proper and legitimate.44 To be sure, in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice few practices are surrounded by greater
feelings of uneasiness and suspicion, feelings provoked largely because of
the almost complete invisibility of the process.4 The low visibility of the
guilty plea process lends uncertainty to the efficacy of the system because
a part of the exchange made for charge or sentence concessions is the
defendant's promise to deny that his plea is the result of a bargain stem-
ming from any sort of inducement.4" Seldom is any "bargain" disclosed,
even though all parties-often the judge included-know that an agree-
ment has been reached. A formal ritua is observed whereby the judge
inquires whether the plea has been induced by promises or coerced by
threats; but the prosecutor and defendant, resembling two black porters
dancing on a railroad platform in some 1940's musical comedy, ritualis-
43. TASK FORCE REPORT 11. It may be a truism to say that the trial process should
be reserved for those cases in which there are real and substantial issues between the
accused and the state. Entwined with this is the problem of differential treatment of
those who plead guilty and those who plead not guilty and are convicted at trial, with
the former being treated with greater lenience than the latter. This assertedly is justi-
fied on the basis that the man who pleads guilty is penitent, while the man who pleads
not guilty but subsequently is convicted obviously is not penitent. The court in Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969), offers the following answer:
One difficulty with this argument is that no court or commentator has explained
why a defendant's insistence upon his self-incrimination privilege is not also
evidence of a lack of repentance. Or his insistence that evidence unconstitu-
tionally seized should not be admitted.
There is a tension between the right of the accused to assert his innocence
and the interest of society in his repentance. But we could consider resolving
this conflict in favor of the latter interest only if the trial offered an un-
paralleled opportunity to test the repentance of the accused. It does not ...
A man may regret his crime but wish desperately to avoid the stigma
of a criminal conviction.
Id. at 270-71.
44. REMINGTON 569.
45. TASK FORCE REPORT 9.
46. REMINGTON 569. The disavowal that any inducements have been made to secure
the plea has been referred to as a "pious fraud," obviously upon the court, but also upon
the entire system of justice. Enker, supra note 1, at 111.
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tically perform their dance of denial that any agreement or inducement
has occurred. In this manner the process goes on, remaining both informal
and invisible and making judicial review of the propriety of the bargain
difficult and often impossible.""
Plea agreements involving sentence concessions are even less visible
than those involving charge concessions. The credibility of the process is
affected because the prosecutor can only promise to recommend an
appropriate sentence to the judge; actual sentencing power belongs
exclusively to the judge. The success of the agreement thus depends on
the judge's acceptance of the recommendation.4" Invisibility may produce
an anomolous situation:
The judge, the public, and sometimes the defendant himself
cannot know for certain who got what from whom in exchange
for what. The process comes to look less rational, more subject
to chance factors, to undue pressures, and sometimes to the
hint of corruption. Moreover, the defendant may not get the
benefit he bargained for. There is no guarantee that the judge
will follow the prosecutor's recommendations for lenient
sentence. In most instances the defendant does not know what
sentence he will receive until he has pleaded guilty and sentence
has been imposed. If the defendant is disappointed, he may
move to withdraw his plea, but there is no assurance that the
motion will be granted, particularly since at the time he
tendered his guilty plea, he probably denied the very negotia-
tions he now alleges.49
The invisibility of the process lends itself to much unnecessary
collateral attack on guilty pleas. A formerly reticent defendant, experi-
47. TASK FORCE REPORT 9. Regarding the difficulties on review, see People v. West,
3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970). The process has been decried:
"There is no justification for a courtroom charade in which the judge asks whether a
plea has been induced by any promises, and the defendant replies that it has not, when
all the actors realize that quite the contrary is true." Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d
264, 274 & n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The propriety of plea bargaining is further complicated by the existence of a large
gray area in which the prosecutor on the one hand can "threaten" to do all that he
properly may do, and on the other hand can "promise" to be a great deal more lenient
than he otherwise could be. The inquiry by the court into the basis of the plea is not
likely to uncover whether such a bargain has been made. REMINGTON 569.
48. Enker 111.
49. TAsK FORCE REPORT 9-10. This again emphasizes that the success of the agree-
ment depends on the judge's acceptance of the recommendation. After all, the defend-
ant's interest primarily is "in controlling the exercise of sentencing discretion, not in a
lawsuit over a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because of disappointment over the
sentence later imposed." Enker 111.
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encing a belated change of heart (reflection prompted, no doubt, by the
very nature of penal confinement), now vigorously will assert abuses
in the negotiation whose existence was very carefully denied when the
opportunity for disclosure was afforded. " The difficulties upon review
are patent:
Most such allegations are, probably correctly, suspect. But a
system that requires the defendant to deny the negotiations
at the very moment he tenders his guilty plea contains potential
for overreaching and unfairness. Under such circumstances,
it becomes extremely difficult to sift the valid from the false
allegations. "'
Low visibility, therefore, accounts for the small amount of judicial
inquiry into the process. The answer, as will be discussed later, appears
to be to make the process more visible, to push it into the open, to trans-
form it from a tacitly permitted process into one explicitly accepted.
judicial acceptance of the process will be concomitant with increased
concern over its regulation "to assure that neither public nor private
interests are sacrificed." 2 One court has put the issue rather well:
The important thing is not that there shall be no "deal"
or "bargain," but that the plea shall be a genuine one, by a
defendant who is guilty; one who understands his situation,
his rights, and the consequences of the plea, and is neither
deceived nor coerced. 5
This expresses an admirable standard; it admits of the validity of a
system in which a steady flow of guilty pleas is desired and encouraged
for reasons discussed earlier. At the same time, it asserts the need for a
greater element of regulation over the system which is expressed here as
the need to understand the basis, i.e., the motivation, behind the de-
fendant's decision to plead guilty. The simple truth, however, is that
because of the low visibility of the present process, the methods used by
50. Enker 111. As the Supreme Court said in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970), "judgments may be made that in the light of later events seem improvident,
although they were perfectly sensible at the time." Id. at 756-57. The Court was re-
ferring to the standard that a plea be intelligently entered. Such a standard, the Court
said, "does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision." Id. at 757.
51. Enker 111.
52. TASK FoRcE REPoRT 10.
53. Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
953 (1965), quoted in TASK FoRcE REPoRT 10.
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courts usually fail to uncover the basis of the guilty plea." Perhaps it
would be well at this point to examine the tools by which courts measure
the efficacy of guilty pleas and to determine why they are ineffective.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLEA-THE STANDARDS
The Voluntariness Standard
In Machibroda v. United States," the Supreme Court said: "A
guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void." 6 This case clearly prescribes
voluntariness as the test to be used in determining the validity of a guilty
plea." Yet, the voluntariness standard has been characterized as "exceed-
ingly ambiguous."" It admits of very little accord with reality. An
analogous requirement in the trial process would be a requirement that
the trial be fair. Neither term satisfactorily imparts an appreciation or
understanding of the complexity of the conviction process.5" The ambi-
guity may be further illustrated:
The choice to plead guilty rather than face the rack is voluntary
in the sense that the subject did have a choice, albeit between
unpleasant alternatives. The defendant who decides to plead
guilty and seek judicial mercy also makes a choice between
what are to him two unpleasant alternatives. If we call the
first choice involuntary and the second voluntary, what we
are really saying is that we are convinced that in the first
case almost all persons so confronted will choose to admit their
guilt but that the defendant's decision is based on more personal
and subjective factors in the second instance.
We are also saying that we approve of judicial mercy but
disapprove of the rack. In other words, "voluntariness"
54. REMINGTON 569; D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 30 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN].
55. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
56. Id. at 493. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Court said: "It
was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty
plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Id. at 242.
Included in the voluntariness test, therefore, is the requirement that the plea be intelligent
and knowing. This simply means that the defendant must realize and understand the
nature and the consequences of his plea. See notes 7-18 supra and accompanying text.
57. This determination is constitutionally required. See McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
58. Enker 116.
59. NEWMAN 8. This may be an unfair analogy, however, because we are talking
about processes of inordinately different dimensions, both from quantitative and qualita-
tive points of view. To the extent that it emphasizes the ambiguity of the voluntariness
standard, however, the analogy is appropriate.
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expresses not merely judgment of fact but an ethical evalua-
tion. 0
For example, threats of physical violence (the rack) certainly would
invalidate a guilty plea, but more subtle forms of compulsion pose equally
serious hazards.0' The process is complicated when less and less force-
ful pressures are brought to bear on the defendant and the inducements
seem less improper. Obviously, this calls for more critical distinctions
to be made between those inducements-and pleas-that are proper and
those that are not. 2 The task is burdensome:
[I]t is difficult to distinguish the psychological experience of
a defendant who is induced to plead guilty by a prosecutor's
or judge's promise of sentencing leniency from that of a
defendant who is induced to plead guilty by his desire to
begin service of his sentence immediately so that he will be
released sooner. There is danger that so long as we adhere
to the terminology of voluntariness, our very inability to dis-
tinguish these cases will lead us to hold involuntary all pleas
induced by any considerations beyond the defendant's sense of
guilt and readiness to admit it publicly. 8
In brief, there is danger that we will become insensitive to the practical
realities of the plea bargaining process.
The Supreme Court, however, has steadfastly adhered to voluntari-
ness as the relevant standard."4 The first indication that something
significant might be happening in the area of guilty pleas occurred in
United States v. Jackson,5 wherein the Supreme Court held section
1201 (a) of the Federal Kidnaping Act unconstitutional insofar as it
compelled a defendant to choose between exercise of the constitutional
right to trial by jury and risk of imposition of the death penalty.6" Such
60. Enker 116 (footnote omitted).
61. REMINGTON 568. It was the more subtle forms of compulsion that led the courts
to adopt more protective safeguards to strengthen the privilege against self-incrimination.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
62. Enker 116.
63. Id.
64. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ; Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970) ; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) ; Parker v. North Caro-
lina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). E.g., the Court in North Carolina v. Alford said: "Jackson
established no new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. The standard was
and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant." 400 U.S. at 31.
65. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
66. By pleading guilty, a defendant waived, inter alia, his right to a jury trial, but
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a choice, the Court felt, was impermissible."' This seemed to be leading
to a more subtle, delicate concept of voluntariness.
However, in the more recent cases of North Carolina v. Alford,"8
Brady v. United States"9 and Parker v. North Carolina," the Court in
situations similar to Jackson reached opposite results. In perhaps the
most striking of these cases, North Carolina v. Alford, the defendant
entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder after having been
charged with first degree murder. He said that he was innocent, but that
he nevertheless wished to plead guilty and that he knew the consequences
of his plea. He testified specifically that the reason for his plea of guilty
was his fear of the death penalty.7 In all three cases, the Court held
that the pleas were voluntarily and intelligently given, that they merely
represented decisions by these defendants to mitigate the possibility that
they might receive the death penalty.72 The Court, in North Carolina
v. Alford, said:
Jackson established no new test for determining the validity of
guilty pleas. The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alter-
native courses of action open to the defendant.
Moreover, in Brady v. United States the Court accepted the following
formulation of the voluntariness standard:
'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel,
must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discon-
tinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises
in so doing he avoided the possibility of the death penalty, because the death sentence
could be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury. On the other hand, if the de-
fendant elected to exercise his right to trial by jury he ran the risk that upon conviction
the jury might recommend the death sentence.
67. 390 U.S. at 572.
68. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
69. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
70. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
71. 400 U.S. at 28 & n.2. North Carolina law provided that upon a plea of guilty
to first degree murder the penalty was life imprisonment, but upon a jury verdict of
guilty of first degree murder the penalty was death unless the jury recommended life im-
prisonment. The penalty for second degree murder was 2 to 30 years imprisonment.
Id. at 27 n.1.
72. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
73. 400 U.S. at 31.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1972], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss2/1
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
that are by their nature improper as having no proper relation-
ship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes) .'
Justice Brennan expressed great concern over the Court's action in
the Parker and Alford cases, feeling that they had done great damage to
the Court's traditional method of analysis:
[T]he Court apparently holds that never, except perhaps in
highly unrealistic hypothetical situations, will the constitutional
defects identified in Jackson vitiate a guilty plea. In so holding,
the Court seriously undermines the rational underpinnings of
Jackson and departs broadly from our prior approach to the
determination of the voluntariness of guilty pleas and also
confessions."
The Requirements of Accuracy
Whatever else these cases may indicate, they reveal that the
voluntariness requirement is an illusory standard, serving to obscure the
more exact requirement that the plea be accurate."6 There is concern
that while in a sense a plea of guilty may be voluntary (in that it is not
the product of coercion or enticement), it may be inaccurate." For
example, a defendant may "voluntarily" admit (without getting into
the truthfulness of his admission) that he acted in a particular manner;
but does the act to which he seeks to plead guilty actually constitute the
crime with which he is charged ?78 The accuracy standard demands that
74. 397 U.S. at 755, quoting with approval Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571,
572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on confession of error on other grounds, 356
U.S. 26 (1958).
75. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 800 & n.2 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
76. NEwMAN 9-10.
77. REMINGTON 570. At the present time, a great deal of uncertainty and confusion
exists as to the scope of inquiry into the accused's knowledge of the consequences of his
plea before it is accepted. Inquiries into the voluntariness of the plea often have not re-
vealed prior events that perhaps evoked the plea of guilty. Only recently has any need
been recognized to look into the accuracy of the defendant's plea. A.B.A. STANDARDS,
supra note 2, at 4.
78. In People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970), the
California Supreme Court examined the propriety of a trial court's acceptance of a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense where the lesser offense was not charged and was not neces-
sarily included in the definitional scope of the greater offense. The defendant in this
case was charged with possession of marijuana, but he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense
(opening or maintaining a place for selling, giving away or using of a narcotic) in
exchange for the prosecutor's agreement not to prosecute him on the possession charge.
The court concluded that acceptance of the plea was proper since the lesser offense,
though not strictly included in the greater, was "'reasonably related to defendant's con-
duct.'" 3 Cal. 3d at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396. This case illustrates, of
course, the accuracy problem--i.e., whether a defendant should be allowed to plead guilty
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there be a factual basis for the plea. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for example, makes the following requirement:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the
consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse
to accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept such plea or a
plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the conse-
quences of the plea. . . The court shall not enter a judg-
ment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a
factual basis for the plea.7 1
Rule 11 refers not only to accuracy, but also to voluntariness and
understanding as well. It is difficult to separate these issues.8" At any
rate, the Advisory Committee on Rules has made the following assess-
ment regarding the accuracy of pleas under Rule 11 :
The court should satisfy itself . . . that the conduct which
the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense included therein to
which the defendant has pleaded guilty. Such inquiry should,
e.g., protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge
but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall
within the charge.81
What does all of this mean? In one particular case," the defendant,
charged with first degree murder, sought to enter a plea of guilty to
second degree murder. Upon inquiry, however, it was learned that the
defendant had no recollection of his actions. The trial court refused to
accept the plea because the defendant could not possibly acknowledge
guilt of an act of which he had no memory. On appeal, the trial judge's
action was affirmed, the court holding that under Rule 11, acceptance of
the plea is discretionary with the judge.88
without an examination into the actual conduct which he admits. The question becomes
even more critical when, as in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the de-
fendant's plea is accompanied by his statement that he is innocent.
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (as amended February 28, 1966) (emphasis added).
80. Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 27, at 873. In McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459 (1969), e.g., the Supreme Court tied all of the issues together when it con-
cluded that a guilty plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id. at 466.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
82. Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966).
83. Id. at 738-39.
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One must note in this case, however, that the colloquy between the
court and the defendant-and the offer of the plea-took place after the
conclusion of the government's case in chief, at a time when the court
should have been apprised of sufficient evidence to show that the defen-
dant was guilty of an offense at least as serious as the one to which he
sought to plead. Under these circumstances perhaps the judge should
have accepted the plea. Indeed, such was the case in North Carolina v.
Alford, 4 where the defendant's plea of guilty to second degree murder
was attended by his denial of commission of the murder. A plea of guilty
usually rests upon an acknowledgment of guilt, or at least the plea
subsumes such an acknowledgment. Without more, this situation would
have evinced a clear dispute between the defendant and the state, and his
protestation of innocence would have negatived his guilty plea. But the
court had heard a very convincing case presented against Alford and
accepted his plea as an indication of his preference to have the case
settled in this manner without a trial.85
The accuracy standard seems to demand that the defendant indeed
be guilty of the offense to which he seeks to plead guilty. The judge, in
accepting a plea of guilty, should therefore fully satisfy himself as to the
defendant's guilt in order to protect in the record the basis for acceptance
of the plea.86 Perhaps Rule 11 solves his problem by requiring only that
there be a factual basis for the plea. If in the opinion of the trial judge
this requirement is met, as was the case in North Carolina v. Alford,
then the trial judge in his discretion may accept the plea. Rule 11 does
not solve the problem, however, of the defendant who wishes to plead
guilty for reasons other than his actual guilt."7
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty includes a provision identical to a portion of Rule 11 :
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without
84. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
85. Id. at 31-32. The Court, in effect, adopted the rule set forth in Maxwell v.
United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966), i.e., that acceptance of the plea is discretion-
ary with the trial judge. 400 U.S. at 38 n.ll. The Court points out in Alford that state
and lower federal courts are divided on the issue of whether a plea can be accepted when,
at the same time the plea is offered, the defendant protests his innocence. 400 U.S. at
33-34. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
86. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
87. Perhaps such a defendant should be allowed to make this judgment for himself,
and if he still wishes to plead guilty, the court can accept his plea if it feels it is in the
interest of justice to do so. See State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 580, 2 N.W. 275, 276
(1879) (dictum) and other cases cited in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33-34
(1970).
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making such inquiry as may satisfy it that there is a factual
basis for the plea."s
Voluntariness and accuracy are treated as two separate issues in the
Standards, and the commentary to the above section suggests that while
a guilty plea may in all respects be voluntary, it nevertheless may be
inaccurate:
The defendant may not completely understand what mental
state and acts constitute commission of the offense charged, and
it may be that his conduct is not as serious as that charged
or that he has a valid defense to the charge. A guilty plea
may be entered by a psychiatrically disturbed person; unlike
a trial of a criminal case, the brief guilty plea process affords
the judge little opportunity to detect incompetency unless the
defendant is obviously retarded or grossly psychotic. A clearly
rational defendant may enter a false plea in the hope of achieving
some goal, as where an innocent defendant is seeking to protect
another person."
The Standards offer a separate section dealing with the issue of
voluntariness:
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first determining that the plea is voluntary.
By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel,
the court should determine whether the tendered plea is the
result of prior plea discussions and a plea agreement, and, if
it is, what agreement has been reached. If the prosecuting
attorney has agreed to seek charge or sentence concessions
which must be approved by the court, the court must advise
the defendant personally that the recommendations of the pros-
ecuting attorney are not binding on the court. The court should
then address the defendant personally and determine whether
any other promises or any force or threats were used to
obtain the plea."
The commentary to this section explains its underlying objective:
The above standard is based upon the assumption that
88. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 2, § 1.6 at 30.
89. Id. at 31. Of course, the effective assistance of counsel should help cure any
problem relating to the defendant's uncertainty about the nature of his act or its relation-
ship to the law. See notes 7-18 supra and accompanying text.
90. Id. § 1.5 at 29.
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it is preferable for the in-court inquiry to give visibility to the
plea discussions-plea agreement process. . . . Such inquiry
will disclose whether there is reason for the court to caution
the defendant of the court's independence from the prosecutor.
This caution will prevent the defendant from being
able to challenge his plea later on the ground that he thought
the court's awareness of the promises made at the time the
plea was received meant that they were then and there accepted
by the court."
The problem, however, is that plea bargaining itself compounds the
issues of voluntariness and accuracy.9" While the assumption is that a
person ordinarily does not plead guilty unless he is guilty, one must
realize at the same time that a person may consent to plead guilty
irrespective of whether he is in fact guilty.9" Where inducements are
tendered, the efficacy of the guilty plea inevitably is weakened to a degree
by the possibility that an innocent defendant might exchange the risk
of conviction and stiff sentence for a promise of leniency or might plead
guilty to "get it over with."9 4 We have already indicated that the inquiry
conducted by the court seldom discloses whether any inducements have
been offered to secure the plea. 5 This adds to the difficulty of sorting
out the valid from the invalid claims when the question of improper
inducements comes up for the first time on review."
91. Id. at 29-30.
92. NEWMAN 9.
93. Id. at 22.
It is undoubtedly true that the great majority of defendants who enter a plea of
guilty are guilty either of the offense charged or of a more serious offense.
However, the risk that a plea which is obtained without resort to threats or
other improper inducements and which is entered with full understanding of the
possible consequences might nonetheless be inaccurate remains a matter of con-
cern.
A.B.A. STANDARDS 31. See notes 5 and 16 supra.
94. NEWMAN 28. In this sense, inducement presents a different issue from coercion.
With inducement the real concern is whether the defendant is actually guilty of the
crime to which he has pleaded. This is not true, however, where coercion is the im-
proper element, for in this event the conviction almost always will be overturned or the
plea refused regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The reasoning behind
the distinction is that the risk of inaccuracy is much greater where the plea stems from
coercion, and coercion is inherently improper. Id. at 28, 30. See Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ; Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964).
95. A.B.A. STANDARDS 4; NEWMAN 30; REMINGTON 569.
96. Enker 111; NEWMAN 41-42. The point is well illustrated by the case of
United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963), wherein the petitioner in 1962 asked
the court to set aside a guilty plea entered in 1932 on the basis that he did not under-
stand the consequences of his plea at the time it was entered. He had entered a plea of
guilty to a "technical violation" of the Mann Act, obviously receiving a charge concession
-a reduction in the charge-in exchange for his plea. Only after the conviction became
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The real issue is whether the offering of the inducement is proper
in the first place,97 which gives rise to the question of whether plea
bargaining, even if it is conducive to consensual, accurate pleas, should
be a practice that is allowed at all. 8 If we conclude that plea bargaining
as a process viewed abstractly is acceptable, then the issue ought to
be twofold: first, whether the promise, honored or not, brought about
the plea of guilty in such a way as to overshadow the defendant's
will and to deprive his decision of its requisite voluntary character;9"
and, second, whether the plea is accurate, i.e., whether there is a factual
basis for the plea.' 0 Until plea bargaining and the guilty plea process
become more visible, however, these issues will not be flushed out, and
the propriety of the process, as well as the appropriateness of the
inducements (granted the propriety of the process) will be difficult to
review.
TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE PLEA PROCESS
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty presupposes that our system will continue to rely upon guilty pleas
as a means of disposition, not merely because disposition by plea is more
expedient, but also because certain values, particularly correctional values,
are served.' The proposed standards seek to secure the propriety of plea
bargaining by endorsing its acceptance and making it more visible and
subject to greater judicial control.' " Given legislative and judicial accept-
a source of embarrassment to him many years later did he seek to have the plea set
aside. The circumstances surrounding the giving of this plea were particularly ob-
scured by time, but this case is typical of so many others in which, for one reason or
another, the issue of propriety of plea negotiations is not raised until after conviction,
when dissatisfaction has set in. See note 50 supra.
97. NEWMAN 29. Some courts in fact have viewed the practice of offering induce-
ments as illegitimate whether the bargain was honored or not. See, e.g., Shupe v. Sigler,
230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964). Contra People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409,
91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
98. NEWMAN 9. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1970), answers this question in the affirmative.
99. NEWMAN 39. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 579 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). After all, the "voluntariness of
[a defendant's] plea does not depend upon whether he was the victim of a false promise."
The question rather is: "Did the promise, even if fulfilled, induce the plea and deprive
it of the character of a voluntary act?" Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir.
1968). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this sort of "but for" test where
instead of a promise from the prosecutor we have an inducement in the form of a statu-
tory scheme that assures that upon a plea of guilty the death penalty will be avoided.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
100. See A.B.A. STANDARD § 1.6 at 30, 1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 and Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rules.
101. A.B.A. STANDARDS 2. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 29-33.
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ance of the plea bargaining process, higher visibility will be assured,
especially when aided by greater inquiry into the circumstances under-
lying the plea-particularly inquiry into its factual basis:
First and foremost, inquiry ensures that the defendant actually
committed a crime at least as serious as the one to which he
is willing to plead. Secondly, investigation into the factual basis
of guilty pleas acts to increase the visibility of charge reduction
practices, a common form of plea agreement. In addition, these
inquiries provide a more adequate record of the conviction
process; this record minimizes the chances of a defendant
successfully challenging his conviction later. . . . Finally,
increased knowledge about the circumstances of the defendant's
offense provides the court with a better assessment of defen-
dant's competency, his willingness to plead guilty, and his
understanding of the charges against him." 8
To facilitate more detailed inquiry by the court, the defendant
should be freed from the necessity of disavowing that any agreement has
been made. He should be allowed-indeed, encouraged-to acknowledge
frankly in open court that negotiations have occurred and the circum-
stances under which he has agreed to plead guilty. The judge then can
review the agreement with greater thoroughness and make it a matter
of record. It has even been suggested that the terms of the agreement be
set forth in writing and entered into the record.' In whatever fashion,
103. Id. at 32-33 (citation omitted). Accord, NEWMAN 21. An excellent synopsis
of the type of inquiry that should be conducted by the judge is found in TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 23, at 13.
104. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970). The
California court was of the opinion that since plea bargaining itself had met with a de-
gree of approval, there was no present need or justification for concealment of the pro-
cess. Rather, the court said,
the basis of the bargain should be disclosed to the court and incorporated in the
record. We should exhume the process from stale obscurantism and let the
fresh light of open analysis expose both the prior discussions and agreements
of the parties, as well as the court's reasons for its resolution of the matter.
3 Cal. 3d at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
The President's Crime Commission also suggested that the agreement be made a
matter of record and that the memorandum contain the following:
an agreed statement of facts of the offense, the opening positions of the parties,
the terms of the agreement, background information relevant to the correctional
disposition, and an explanation of why the negotiated disposition is appropri-
ate . . . . Use of a memorandum is preferable to relying entirely upon judicial
questioning, because it should encourage more thoughtful negotiations and a
more complete consideration of the agreement by the judge.
TASK FORCE REPORT 12.
In addition, see the argument for making plea agreements a part of the record in
Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and Agreements-on Record, 1 LOYOLA U.L.J.
1 (1970).
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the agreement should be revealed, resulting in a more complete examina-
tion of the plea negotiations and greater formalism in the process itself.05
This requires, of course, greater participation by the judge since it
calls for an in-depth inquiry "more precise and detailed than the brief
and perfunctory question-and-answer sequence that has been common
in some courts."1 8 The increased role of the judge, however, carries some
limitations with it. Because the judge is regarded by the defendant as
being in a position of power, he is capable of wielding a great deal of
influence-unwittingly or intentionally--over the defendant. Despite his
most sincere interest in a defendant, he may exercise a subtle, yet
coercive, influence that may cause a defendant to plead guilty. The judge,
because he is the very person who should satisfy himself that the plea is
accurate and voluntarily given, should never be involved directly in the
plea negotiations."0 7 Plea negotiations should be confined to the pro-
secutor and defense counsel.'
Serious doubt exists whether a defendant should be allowed to
plead guilty without having received the advice of counsel." 9 A defendant
has too many interests at stake to- proceed on his own without effective
representation. For one thing, counsel is in a much better position to
evaluate the weight of the prosecutor's case. Counsel also can place the
facts into proper perspective with the law-something which is vital to
the accuracy of a plea but with which laymen may experience difficulty.
In addition, counsel can impart to the defendant an understanding of the
105. NEWMAN 21.
106. TASK FORCE REPORT 13.
107. Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 27, at 891-92. The judge's role is not that
of participant, but rather that of an impartial examiner, so that he is ill-suited to engage
directly in plea discussions. TASK FORCE REPORT 13. He is at his best when serving as
an arbiter, choosing between competing alternative solutions proposed by the parties
themselves. Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 THE ANNALS 70, 79 (1967).
An example of a judge overreaching his function in accepting a plea is found in
Rogers v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So. 2d 331 (1962). The court there said:
This case is unique because the person charged with inducing the plea of
guilty with promises and persuasion is the judge who accepted the plea and
whose duty it was to see that the plea was voluntary. Because of the nature of
the judicial function and the power and prestige of a circuit judge, any acts or
words of his containing promises, or tending to persuade, have a much greater
significance than acts or words of others.
243 Miss. at 228-29, 136 So. 2d at 335.
108. PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
109. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956). The judge's
responsibility in inquiring into the basis of a guilty plea is even greater when the de-
fendant has waived the right to counsel and makes his plea without the aid of counsel.
Thompson, The Judge's Responsibility on a Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 218
(1960). See Van Moetke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 722-24 (1947).
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consequences of entering a plea of guilty.1 °
Certainly judges are more assured where a defendant is adequately
represented by counsel that a plea is accurate;.. if the judge has any
doubts about the accuracy of the plea, the concurrence of counsel in the
plea helps to resolve those doubts. In addition, where a defendant is
represented by an attorney, the judge is more confident that the de-
fendant's rights (which are waived by entry of the plea) and his alter-
natives have been explained to him. Consequently, the judge, by inquir-
ing into the basis of the plea, serves as a secondary safeguard to secure the
voluntariness and accuracy of the plea.' 2
Any plea agreement reached should be in the public interest, which
means that the scope of the discussions should be limited to correctional
objectives."' This reflects on still another responsibility of the judge:
The judge also must decide that the agreed disposition
is fair and appropriate in light of all the circumstances. The
judge should determine that the disposition is consistent with
the sentencing practices of the jurisdiction and that the pro-
secutor did not agree to an inadequate sentence for a serious
offender." 4
CONCLUSION
What all of this really indicates is an increased role not only for the
110. Guilty Plea Bargaining 888-89. See TASK FORCE REPORT 12.
111. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970).
112. NEWMAN 13-14.
113. The President's Crime Commission described this function as follows:
Discussions between prosecutor and defense counsel should deal explicitly
with dispositional questions and the development of a correctional program for
the offender. A plea negotiation is fundamentally a negotiation about the cor-
rectional disposition of a case and is, therefore, a matter of moment to both
the defendant and the community.
TASK FORCE REPORT 12.
As Enker has pointed out, however, defense counsel may have difficulty assimilating
the public's interests along with those of his client:
[Diefense counsel, perhaps in part because of legitimate skepticism over the
availability of meaningful correctional treatment and of doubts as to the fair-
ness of such programs, seem to regard their duty to the client solely in terms of
obtaining for him as lenient a sentence as possible. Perhaps a broader view
of the lawyer's role should include within the counseling function the duty to
attempt to make the client aware of the fact that he has a problem and of his
need for some correctional program.
Enker 111.
114. TASK FORCE REPORT 13. However, the "public interest . . . need not neces-
sarily mean a longer sentence; it may include identification of the sources of defendant's
problems and the development and suggestion of a program of correctional treatment that
is relevant to these problems." Enker 111.
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judge but for the prosecutor and defense counsel as well. Such a proce-
dure as discussed herein will be more time-consuming, but it should help
to reduce the number of collateral attacks on guilty pleas, thereby becom-
ing in the long run a process assuring judicial economy." 5 Moreover, it
will tend to flush out any issues relating to the propriety of the negotia-
tions at the time the plea is entered rather than to cause them to arise for
the first time at a later date." 6 The present trend is toward securing for
the guilty plea process a more searching examination into all matters
relating to the decision to plead guilty,"' toward transforming rhetoric
into reality:
The important thing is not that there shall be no 'deal'
or 'bargain,' but that the plea shall be a genuine one, by a
defendant who is guilty, one who understands his situation,
his rights, and the consequences of the plea, and is neither
deceived nor coerced."'
While this expresses the ideal, it is far from reality. So much more
is needed. There are increasing signs, e.g., that plea bargaining is becom-
ing a more formalized process." 9 But as long as the practice remains for
the most part "in the limbo of dubious legality,"' 2 it will continue to
function beneath our level of visibility, and will elude efforts to make it
an accepted, legitimate part of our criminal process. The suggestions
offered in this article are not a panacea, nor were they offered as such.
They will not solve all of the problems of plea bargaining, but they are
calculated to improve it. In this sense they constitute not an end, but an
experiment, a trial that we cannot afford not to attempt, and only by
experimenting will we know where to go from here. 1'
115. TASK FORCE REPORT 13.
116. This would minimize occurrence of situations such as that in United States v.
Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963), in which the court was asked in 1962 to vitiate a
guilty plea given in 1932. Indeed, the time differential may account in part for the
enigmatic result in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court refused to set aside a guilty plea offered in 1959.
117. NEWMAN 21.
118. Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381
U.S. 953 (1965), quoted in TASK FORCE REPORT 10. This language is worth repeating
here because it sums up in a simple but forceful manner the objective that we ought to
be seeking in the plea process.
119. See note 104 supra.
120. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 608, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393
(1970).
121. "[E]xperience with a plea bargaining system in which negotiations are open,
visible, and subject to judicial scrutiny should help to identify the risks involved in the
system, and indicate the need for and direction of further change." TASK FORCE REPORT
13.
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